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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between investor protection and income in-
equality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more
willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to ￿rms, thereby improving the
degree of risk sharing between ￿nanciers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by
increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more risk taking. By increas-
ing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced
by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, the relationship between
investor protection and income inequality is non monotonic, since the risk-taking ef-
fect dominates at low levels of investor protection, while risk sharing becomes stronger
when more risk is taken. Empirical evidence from up to sixty-seven countries spanning
the period 1976-2004 supports the predictions of the model.
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11 Introduction
The literature on institutions, law and economics has shown that investor protection a⁄ects
signi￿cantly the ￿nancial structure of an economy, and has investigated the e⁄ects of
￿nancial development on economic performance in terms of GDP growth, productivity
and investment.1 What has received less attention is that investor protection, through
its e⁄ect on ￿nancial structure and the allocation of risk, may in￿ uence the risk taking
behavior of investors and ￿rms, thereby a⁄ecting income inequality. To ￿ll this gap,
this paper investigates the link between investor protection and income inequality, both
theoretically and empirically. It proposes a model where investor protection promotes risk
sharing between ￿nanciers and entrepreneurs, thereby inducing more risk taking in the
economy. Better risk sharing and wider risk taking, in turn, a⁄ect income inequality in
opposite ways. The main results of the model are then confronted with the data.
To formalize these ideas, I construct a simple model of investors and entrepreneurs
where agents are risk averse and heterogeneous in ability. Investors decide how to allocate
their endowment between safe loans (debt) and diversi￿ed portfolios of risky (equity-like)
assets, while entrepreneurs face a choice between a safe and a risky technology, whose
probability of success depends on ability. Starting up a ￿rm entails a ￿xed entry cost that
entrepreneurs must cover by borrowing. Financial markets are subject to a moral hazard
problem arising from the non-observability of output to ￿nanciers. Measures of investor
protection alleviate this ￿nancial friction. In particular, I assume that investor protection
promotes transparency by imposing a cost to misreport cash ￿ ow.2 For instance, this
cost can be thought of as the additional honorary an auditor would charge to certify a
falsi￿ed book or to design ￿nancial operations to hide revenues from outside ￿nanciers.
Better guarantees generate more con￿dence among investors, thereby making them more
willing to insure the entrepreneurs through lending. It follows that in ￿nancial systems
with stronger investor protection there is more equity-like external ￿nance relative to
debt, which o⁄ers entrepreneurs a higher degree of risk sharing. Finally, I rule out wealth
heterogeneity among agents, so that all inequality is due to idiosyncratic factors (ability),
￿nancial market conditions and income risk.3
1See, among others, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), La Porta et al. (1997) and (2006), Beck and Levine
(2004), Levine (2005) and references therein.
2Investor protection takes the form of a hiding cost also in Aghion et al. (2005), Castro et al. (2004)
and Lacker and Weinberg (1989). In this paper, like in the two latter, the cost is proportional to the
hidden amount, while in the ￿rst, it equals a fraction of the initial investment.
3Using microdata, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) show that wealth may not be the key factor a⁄ecting
entrepreneurial choices, while Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) provide evidence that skills and the fear of failure
are among the most important determinants of entrepreneurship. This lends support to my modelling
choice of abstracting from wealth heterogeneity to better focus on other factors, such as risk and ability.
2In the model, better investor protection a⁄ects income inequality in two ways. (i)
It improves risk sharing, thereby reducing income volatility for the agents operating the
risky technology; and (ii) it raises the share of entrepreneurs choosing the risky option, and
therefore being exposed to earnings risk. While (i) tends to reduce inequality, (ii) raises it.
The analysis shows that the ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect (ii) dominates when investor protection is
low since risky entrepreneurs still face a considerable earnings risk, while the ￿risk sharing￿
e⁄ect (i) prevails when investor protection is high since better insurance applies to a large
mass of risky entrepreneurs. Hence, the relationship between investor protection and
income inequality is predicted to be non-monotonic. Moreover, since investor protection
a⁄ects the ￿nancial structure of the economy, the same non-monotonic relationship holds
between the share of equity-like external ￿nance and inequality.
To evaluate empirically the main results of the model, I consider a dataset covering up
to sixty-seven countries observed between 1976 and 2004. The choice of a cross-country
analysis is dictated by the fact that investor protection is generally set by law and hence
exhibits little within-country variation. A major challenge for the empirical part is to ￿nd
appropriate measures of the relevant variables. I adopt two proxies for inequality: ￿rst, the
Gini coe¢ cient of the income distribution, which is available for a relatively large sample
of countries and years. Although the model refers to entrepreneurs, which belong to the
top income percentiles, three main arguments may justify the use of a general indicator
of inequality.4 First, recent evidence from several countries suggests that a large fraction
of the variation in income inequality over the last two decades is explained by changes
at the top of the distribution (see, among others, Atkinson et al., 2009 and Heathcote
et al., 2010). Second, employees normally earn higher wages and are subject to higher
employment risk when working in more productive and riskier ￿rms.5 Hence the results
obtained for entrepreneurs may be expected to trickle down to all workers. Finally, the
model could also be interpreted as one of occupational choice ￿ la Kihlstrom and La⁄ont
(1979), where each agent can either be a worker receiving a ￿xed wage or an entrepreneur
facing risk. In this case, the implications on earnings inequality would refer to the entire
population. Nonetheless, for robustness, I replicate part of the analysis proxying inequality
with the ratio of the top 1st to 10th percentiles of the income distribution. The main
shortcoming with this variable, recently compiled by Alvaredo et al. (2011), is its very
limited cross-sectional availability (at present, the database covers only 23 countries).
Turning to the independent variables, I proxy investor protection with the de jure index
4Note that, if investor protection a⁄ected inequality among the poor in a di⁄erent way and through
another channel, my estimates would su⁄er from attenuation bias.
5Evidence that more productive ￿rms pay higher wages is provided, among others, by Oi and Idson
(1999).
3compiled by La Porta et al. (2006), and estimate its non-linear relationship with inequality.
Unfortunately, this series is available for a relatively limited number of countries and does
not exhibit any time variation. To exploit the wider cross-section of the data on inequality
and its time-series dimension, I evaluate empirically the theoretical mechanism following
a two-step approach. Since the model predicts that investor protection a⁄ects inequality
through its e⁄ect on the optimal ￿nancial contract, I ￿rst show that better protection tends
to coincide with a higher share of equity-like external ￿nance, and then I estimate a non-
linear relationship between the indicator of ￿nancial structure and inequality on a wider
cross-section and a panel. The results suggest that inequality varies non-monotonically
both with investor protection and the relative weight of equity-like ￿nance, as predicted
by the model.
The paper is related to four main strands of literature. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005),
as well as La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2006), show that investor protection, and
in general institutions aimed at contractual protection, a⁄ect the ￿nancial structure of
an economy by promoting the development of stock markets, but have unclear e⁄ects
on economic performance. No attention was devoted, however, to study the e⁄ects on
inequality.
Theoretical contributions from the growth literature (see Aghion and Bolton, 1997,
Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Galor and Zeira, 1993, Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990,
and Piketty, 1997, among others) have proposed explanations for the relationship between
￿nancial development, inequality and growth. In most of these models, income inequality
originates from heterogeneity in the initial wealth distribution, paired with credit market
frictions.6 As the poorest are subject to credit constraints, they are prevented from mak-
ing the e¢ cient investment. Over time, capital accumulation determines the dynamics of
wealth and income. I depart from this approach in two main respects. First, the ￿nan-
cial friction a⁄ects the share of risk borne by agents, rather than the amount of external
￿nance available to them. Second, I consider a di⁄erent source of ex-ante heterogeneity
(entrepreneurial ability), and propose a new mechanism translating di⁄erences in ability
into income inequality that is independent of wealth accumulation. In the present pa-
per, heterogeneity in productivity, the extent of risk sharing and risk taking ultimately
determine the income distribution.7
6The ￿nancial friction may consist in the non-observability of ex-post outcomes as in Banerjee and
Newman (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993), or of e⁄ort as in Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty
(1997).
7Similarly to this paper, in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) income inequality is generated by managerial
incentives. Antunes et al. (2008) propose a quantitative model with heterogeneity in wealth and ability
where weak ￿nancial institutions hinder growth and raise income inequality. Yet, both papers abstract
from ￿rm-speci￿c idiosyncratic risk.
4This paper also contributes to the recent literature on the macroeconomic implications
of entrepreneurship which addresses the e⁄ects of ￿nancial frictions on investment, growth
and volatility through their impact on entrepreneurial choices (see Quadrini, 2010 for a
review). The papers focusing on distributional issues tend to consider ￿nancial frictions
as a factor that perpetuates and exacerbates wealth inequality by a⁄ecting the investment
and saving choices of entrepreneurs, and abstract from entrepreneurial risk sharing and
risk taking. Other papers relate ￿nancial institutions and entrepreneurship to growth
through risk sharing, risk taking, and managerial ability, but do not study inequality.
For instance, Castro et al. (2004) show that ￿nancial frictions may slow down aggregate
capital accumulation due to imperfect risk sharing, and that the overall e⁄ect on growth
may be ambiguous. Michelacci and Schivardi (2011) argue that, if ￿rms cannot diversify
away their idiosyncratic risk due to ￿nancial frictions, there is less risk taking and this
has negative e⁄ects on growth. Thesmar and Thoenig (2011) point out that increased
participation of shareholders, by providing better risk sharing, induces higher risk taking
and volatility among public companies, and has the opposite e⁄ect on private ￿rms without
access to risk sharing. Caselli and Gennaioli (2011) show that weak contract enforcement
deteriorates productivity (TFP) by discouraging untalented family-￿rm owners from hiring
competent managers (as in Burkart et al., 2003).
The vast empirical literature on ￿nancial development and economic performance (see
Levine, 2005 and references therein) provides evidence that deeper ￿nancial markets foster
growth. Very little attention was paid to the e⁄ects of ￿nancial development on income
inequality. Two recent contributions (see Clarke et al., 2006 and Beck et al., 2007) show
that higher availability of credit to the private sector tends to reduce income inequality.
My results are consistent with this evidence, but also provide a novel insight suggesting
that equity-like ￿nance, promoting risk taking, may increase inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
of entrepreneurial choice and shows how earnings and the degree of risk taking vary in
equilibrium with investor protection. In section 3, I characterize analytically and by means
of numerical solution how income inequality responds to changes in investor protection
and ￿nancial structure. Section 4 brie￿ y discusses some reasons why investor protection
may be imperfect and vary across countries. Section 5 provides empirical evidence from
up to sixty-seven countries over the period 1976-2004 supporting the main results of the
model, and section 6 concludes.
52 The model
In this section, I propose a simple static model where risk-averse agents, heterogeneous
in their entrepreneurial ability, have to choose between safe and risky projects and need
external ￿nance. Asymmetric information in the ￿nancial market generates a moral hazard
problem that makes it too costly for some entrepreneurs to ￿nance risky projects. Investor
protection may alleviate moral hazard, thereby easing the conditions of access to ￿nance
and promoting both risk sharing and risk taking.
2.1 Set up
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of risk-averse agents whose
preferences are represented by
V = E[u(c)];
where E is the expectation operator, c is consumption of a homogeneous good, and the
utility function satis￿es the following properties: u0 > 0, u00 < 0 and limc!0 u0 (c) = 1.
Agents are heterogeneous in their ability, denoted by ￿ 2 [0;1], drawn from a con-
tinuously di⁄erentiable distribution G(￿), but have no wealth endowment. They work
as self-employed entrepreneurs and can choose to produce the consumption good using
either a safe or a risky technology. Their consumption may be heterogeneous and depend
on individual ability and technological choice. The capital needed for production may
be raised on the international ￿nancial market, where a risk-free asset yielding a gross
return r is traded, along with risky assets that will be described later. The price of the
consumption good and the safe interest rate are determined on the world market and are
assumed to be constant and normalized to 1.
2.1.1 Technology
Each entrepreneur with ability ￿ can choose between a safe and a risky technology. The
former generates a constant level of production which is independent of ability:
yS (￿) = yS = B.
The performance of ￿rms using the risky technology depends on entrepreneurial ability.8
For simplicity, I assume that ability only a⁄ects the probability of success and not the
8See Schiller and Crewson (1997), and Fairly and Robb (2003) for empirical studies on the determinants
of entrepreneurial success, mainly among small ￿rms.
6quantities produced.9 In particular, an entrepreneur with ability ￿ generates output
y (￿) =
(
yH = A with probability ￿
yL = ’A with probability 1 ￿ ￿
where ’ 2 (0;1) and yH and yL denote production in the good and bad state respectively.
This implies that a ￿rm￿ s expected cash ￿ ow is [￿+ (1￿ ￿)’]A, which is increasing in
ability. Success is i.i.d. within each ability group, hence there is no aggregate risk and
total production of entrepreneurs with ability ￿ equals g (￿)[￿+ (1￿ ￿)’]A, where g (￿)
is the density of the ability distribution. Moreover, I assume that, regardless of their
technological choice, entrepreneurs have to pay a ￿xed entry cost of 1 that can be covered
by raising funds on the international ￿nancial market.
2.1.2 Financial market
I assume that investors in the international ￿nancial market are atomistic and risk-averse,
and have perfect information about the risk-free interest rate (r = 1), production technolo-
gies (B, A and ’), the individual ability of each entrepreneur (￿) and her technological
choice, but cannot observe ￿nal output (y).
The ￿nancial contract entails the commitment of the ￿rm to repay after production a
certain amount, possibly contingent on the reported realization of output. Since produc-
tion functions and technological choices are public information, entrepreneurs using the
safe technology are known to generate with certainty a cash ￿ ow of B and thus face a ￿x
repayment equal to the international gross risk-free rate, 1, which gives them a payo⁄ of
wS = B ￿ 1:
The situation is di⁄erent if the borrower runs a risky project. Once production has oc-
curred, an unlucky entrepreneur can only report output yL = ’A, and hence repay to
investors the cash ￿ ow minus her earnings: yL￿ wL (￿). If successful, the entrepreneur
may misreport the output realization and pretend to be in the bad state, in order to
repay yL￿ wL (￿) instead of yH￿ wH (￿). However, I assume that measures of investor
protection, speci￿c to the borrower￿ s country, make misreporting costly. For every unit of
hidden cash ￿ ow, the ￿rm incurs a cost p 2 [0;1], so that the payo⁄ from misreporting is
9Ability can be considered as playing a twofold role. It enhances the chance of success in risky enter-
prises, as assumed in the model. But it may also raise productivity regardless of the technological choice.
In the next section, I argue that this second e⁄ect can be introduced into the model without a⁄ecting the
qualitative results. The relevant assumption is that ability is more important in the risky sector, which
seems realistic.
7wL (￿)+ (1 ￿ p)
￿
yH ￿ yL￿
. Truth-telling is rational as long as its value is at least equal
















Financial contracts are set to maximize the entrepreneur￿ s expected utility, V R (￿),
subject to the IC constraint and the outsiders￿participation constraint. The latter requires
that investors be indi⁄erent between lending to all entrepreneurs with ability ￿, and buying
the risk-free asset.10 Thus, the payo⁄s from the risky choice are determined as the solution
to the optimal ￿nancial contract problem:
max
wH(￿);wL(￿)






















A ￿ wH (￿)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
’A ￿ wL (￿)
￿
= 1: (PC)
Note that a pooled portfolio of loans to the i.i.d. entrepreneurs with ability ￿ yields the
LHS of (PC) with certainty, so that investors face no uncertainty.11
2.1.3 Equilibrium
Each entrepreneur with ability ￿ has rational expectations and chooses technology, T 2
fS;Rg (safe or risky), to maximize her expected utility:
max
T2fS;Rg
V T (￿); (P2)
where
V S (￿) = u
￿
wS￿









10See Castro et al. (2004) for a similar way of modelling the optimal ￿nancial contact.
11It follows that the participation constraint is the same as in the case of competitive, risk-neutral
￿nanciers with a single borrower with ability ￿.
8In other words, every entrepreneur chooses technology, given her individual ability ￿ and
the optimal ￿nancial contract fwH (￿); wL (￿)g which solves (P1).
De￿nition Given the cost of misreporting, p, the equilibrium for this small open econ-
omy is de￿ned as the set of technological choices and ￿nancial contracts fT (￿); wH (￿);
wL (￿)
￿
￿2[0;1], such that each agent with ability ￿ solves (P2), with payo⁄s solving (P1)
subject to (IC￿ ) and (PC).
For simplicity, I assume that ’A < B < A, which implies that the risky technology is
on average more productive than the safe one for some entrepreneurs.
2.2 Solution
To solve for the optimal technological choice (P2), entrepreneurs need to know the payo⁄s
from the risky project, determined by the optimal ￿nancial contract fwH (￿); wL (￿)g￿2[0;1].
Therefore, I proceed backwards and start by solving problem (P1) subject to (IC￿ ) and
(PC). I ￿rst obtain the optimal contract under e¢ cient markets (with no information
asymmetry) and then compute the optimal payo⁄s in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation for a given level of investor protection. Next, I characterize the technological choice
fT (￿)g￿2[0;1], given the optimal payo⁄s. Finally, I show how the equilibrium varies with
the degree of investor protection.
2.2.1 Optimal ￿nancial contract: e¢ cient markets
If investors could perfectly observe the cash ￿ ow of a ￿rm, misreporting would be impossi-
ble, and hence the optimal ￿nancial contract would simply maximize the expected utility
of a risk-averse borrower with success probability ￿ (P1) subject to the participation con-
straint of a perfectly diversi￿ed lender (PC). Thus, investors would provide entrepreneurs
with full insurance in exchange for an expected gross return equal to the safe rate, as










wFB (￿) = ￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)’A ￿ 1;
where u0 is the ￿rst derivative of u and wFB (￿) denotes the e¢ cient, ￿rst-best, payo⁄ of
a risky entrepreneur with ability ￿, which is equal to her expected cash ￿ ow, increasing
in ability, minus the risk-free interest rate repayment.
92.2.2 Optimal ￿nancial contract: Asymmetric information
If the cash ￿ ow cannot be observed by outsiders, entrepreneurs may have an incentive
to misreport, and hence the optimal ￿nancial contract must also satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC￿ ). The ￿rst-best contract solves (P1) subject to (IC￿ ) and
(PC) only if investor protection drives the gain from misreporting down to zero, which
happens only for p = 1. This means that when investor protection is perfect (p = 1),
outside ￿nanciers can behave as if they were perfectly informed, and thus fully insure
entrepreneurs without inducing them to misreport.
If investor protection is not perfect (0 ￿ p < 1), ￿rst-best state-invariant earnings are
not incentive compatible since wFB (￿) < wFB (￿)+ (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ’)A and entrepreneurs
in the good state would be tempted to misreport their cash ￿ ow realization. Due to risk







. The combination of wH (￿) and wL (￿) that achieves this
goal and complies with incentive compatibility is the one satisfying (IC0) with equality.
Investors￿participation constraint (PC) needs also hold with equality, so that the optimal
￿nancial contract satis￿es the following ￿rst order conditions:
wH (￿) = wL (￿) + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ’)A; (1)
wL (￿) = ’A ￿ 1 + ￿p(1 ￿ ’)A: (2)
2.2.3 Technological choice
Entrepreneurs with ability ￿ will choose the risky technology if it gives at least the same
expected utility as the safe project:
T (￿) = R () V R (￿) ￿ V S:
Since the state-contingent payo⁄s of a risky entrepreneur, wH (￿) and wL (￿) in equations
(1) and (2), increase with ability (￿), while the di⁄erence between them is independent
of it, her expected utility, V R, is also increasing with ability. Expected utility of a safe
entrepreneur, instead, is constant and does not depend on ability. This implies that the
solution to the technological choice problem (P2) features a threshold ability level ￿￿ such
that the agents with ability higher than ￿￿ choose the risky technology while those with
lower ability choose the safe project. This property is formalized in Lemma 1.













is the solution to (P1) subject to (IC0) and (PC):
10Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that, due to risk aversion, the expected payo⁄ of risky entrepreneurs with abil-
ity equal to the threshold, ￿￿wH (￿￿)+ (1 ￿ ￿￿)wL (￿￿), must be higher than the safe
earnings, wS.
2.2.4 Investor protection and the equilibrium
To study how investor protection a⁄ects the equilibrium of the model, I ￿rst focus on the
optimal ￿nancial contract and then on technological choice. The optimal payo⁄s of risky
entrepreneurs can be conveniently re-written as
wH (￿) = wFB (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ’)A
wL (￿) = wFB (￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ’)A:
The ￿rst component, wFB (￿), represents the payo⁄ of a risky entrepreneur with ability
￿ under perfect investor protection (p = 1). The second term is the adjustment that
investors have to set to induce truth-telling, which is state contingent and varies with
ability and investor protection. This term is positive in the good and negative in the bad
state to o⁄set the temptation of an entrepreneur to misreport cash ￿ ow. It is decreasing
in p because when the unit cost of hiding cash ￿ ow is high, the temptation to misreport is
low and hence a smaller deviation from the ￿rst best is enough to achieve truth-telling. It
follows that also the wedge between state-contingent earnings, wH (￿)￿wL (￿), measuring
the price that entrepreneurs have to pay for the temptation to misreport, is decreasing in
investor protection. Moreover, since more skilled entrepreneurs are more likely to be in
the good state, and hence to be tempted to hide cash ￿ ow, higher ability implies lower
payo⁄s in both states relative to the e¢ cient case, as long as investor protection is not
perfect. Overall, both wH (￿) and wL (￿) are increasing in entrepreneurial ability, as
clearly suggested by equations (1) and (2). Finally, notice that for p = 0, the ￿nancial
contract is akin to debt, implying a constant repayment equal to the risk-free rate, and
the entire risk is borne by the entrepreneur. As investor protection increases, investors
bear more and more risk, which makes the ￿nancial contract closer to equity.
Expected earnings of a risky entrepreneur with ability ￿,
E [w j ￿] = [￿ (1 ￿ ’) + ’]A ￿ 1;
are equal to the ￿rst best payo⁄, wFB (￿), and do not vary with investor protection. Her
expected utility, due to risk aversion, falls when the di⁄erence between state-contingent
11earnings grows. Therefore, a rise in p, by reducing the gap between wH (￿) and wL (￿),
increases the expected utility of risky entrepreneurs, V R.
Since equilibrium earnings are functions of investor protection and the technological
parameters, also the threshold ability ￿￿ varies with p, A, ’ and B, as formalized in
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The threshold ability ￿￿ is a decreasing function of investor protection (p)
and technological level of the risky sector (A); it increases with the riskiness of the risky













Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, stronger investor protection allows entrepreneurs to better share risks with
investors, thereby raising the expected utility drawn from the risky project. Since payo⁄s
and hence V R are increasing in ability, a rise in p makes the risky technology preferable
to the most able among safe entrepreneurs, i.e. reduces threshold ability ￿￿. A higher A
implies that productivity of the risky project increases, and more so in the good state. As
a consequence, payo⁄s rise but also the wedge between them. Since the overall e⁄ect on
expected utility is positive, a more productive technology reduces the threshold ability for
risky entrepreneurship. The parameter ’ captures the riskiness of the risky technology
(maximum risk for ’ = 0, no risk for ’ = 1), and also a⁄ects its expected productivity. If
it grows, it makes the risky option preferable to the most able among safe entrepreneurs
because it reduces the volatility of state-contingent earnings and increases their expected
value, thereby raising expected utility. Trivially, higher productivity in the safe industry,
B, makes it more attractive, thereby inducing the least able among risky entrepreneurs to
adopt the safe technology, which rises the threshold ￿￿.
The threshold also depends on risk aversion, since the curvature of the utility function
a⁄ects expected utility for given probability of success (￿, i.e., ability). For instance, under
CRRA utility with relative risk aversion equal to or higher than one, the risky technology
is not run in equilibrium (￿￿ = 1) as long as the earnings of the most able in the bad
state are non positive, i.e., for p ￿ (1 ￿ ’A)=[(1￿ ’)A], which is positive for ’A < 1.
Alternatively, when risk aversion is su¢ ciently low, there may be entrepreneurs choosing
the risky project even in the absence of investor protection (￿￿
p=0 = ￿￿
max < 1).
In the case of perfect investor protection (p = 1), the risky technology gives higher ex-
pected utility than the safe one whenever its expected productivity is higher: [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)’]A






and verify that it lies in the support of ￿ under the hypothesis that ’A < B < A.
In the general case of imperfect investor protection (0 ￿ p < 1), the expression for the





wS with probability 1 for ￿ < ￿￿
wH (￿) with probability ￿ for ￿ ￿ ￿￿
wL (￿) with probability 1 ￿ ￿ for ￿ ￿ ￿￿
where wH (￿) and wL (￿) are given by (1) and (2). Henceforth, I denote the threshold
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Figure 1: Ability and Earnings in Equilibrium.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium ability-earnings pro￿les. If there is perfect investor
protection, p = 1, income of entrepreneurs is described by the solid line. It is ￿ at and
equal to wS for the less able, who run the safe project, and proportional to ability for the
more talented ones, who run the risky project. Due to perfect risk sharing, earnings are
constant across states. If investor protection drops to 0 ￿ p < 1 (dashed line), ￿nancing
a risky ￿rm becomes more costly, thereby inducing the least able among entrepreneurs
13to shift to the safe technology. Graphically, (1) the mass of risky ￿rms shrinks, i.e., the
￿ at segment of the earnings pro￿le becomes longer. I de￿ne this as the ￿risk taking￿
e⁄ect. (2) Earnings become state contingent, and the wedge between wH
p<1 and wL
p<1
widens as p falls due to worse risk sharing. I call this the ￿risk sharing￿e⁄ect. The fact
that imperfect insurance reduces expected utility of risky entrepreneurs is captured by the
jump in expected earnings at the threshold ￿￿
p<1.
Note that safe entrepreneurs are indi⁄erent between raising external ￿nance through
standard debt and equity-like contracts. Risky ￿rms instead can only be started if ￿nanced
through equity-like instruments. This implies that, in the presence of an in￿nitesimal cost
of signing the optimal ￿nancial contract, safe entrepreneurs choose debt, and hence the
￿nancial structure of the economy, described by the weight of equity in total external
￿nance, is captured in the model by the size of the risky sector, which is denoted as
￿ ￿ 1 ￿ G(￿￿) for empirical purpose. This measure is decreasing in the threshold ability
and increasing in investor protection, and varies with technological parameters.
Corollary 1 The weight of equities in total external ￿nance, ￿, is decreasing in the thresh-
old ability (￿￿), the riskiness of the risky technology (inverse of ’) and the productivity of
















Proof. See the Appendix.
3 Evaluating income distribution
In this section, I study how investor protection a⁄ects income inequality. I consider
measures of inequality accounting for the entire distribution of income such as the variance
and the Gini coe¢ cient, and show analytically and by means of numerical solution how
these respond to changes in investor protection and in the ￿nancial structure.
143.1 Analytical results
A ￿rst measure of inequality that takes into account the entire income distribution is the
variance of the earnings realizations:





















E[w] = G(￿￿)wS +
Z 1
￿￿
E[w j ￿]g (￿)d￿
is the average income in the economy. Lemma 3 proves E[w] to be increasing in investor
protection.





Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, an increase in the cost of misreporting, p, gives risky entrepreneurs better
insurance, thereby encouraging more agents to choose the risky technology with a higher
payo⁄. This implies that also aggregate production and welfare increase with investor
protection.12
Equation (3) for the variance of earnings suggests that better investor protection a⁄ects
inequality both through the ￿risk sharing￿and the ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect: by the former, it
closes the gap between state-contingent earnings of entrepreneurs, thereby reducing income
di⁄erentials among agents with the same ability, ￿ ￿ ￿￿, and hence overall inequality. On
the other hand, a drop in the threshold ability ￿￿ implies that a mass g (￿￿) of agents
switches to state-contingent earnings, which is likely to translate into higher inequality.
To better evaluate these forces and the overall e⁄ect of investor protection on inequality,
it is useful to write down the analytical expression for the derivative of the variance of the
earnings distribution with respect to p:
dV ar
dp









12In the next session, I discuss alternative assumptions under which perfect investor protection may not
be socially optimal or politically viable.
15The ￿rst term captures the ￿risk sharing￿ e⁄ect of investor protection, which tends to
reduce inequality and is stronger the larger is the mass of risky entrepreneurs, i.e. the
lower the threshold ability ￿￿, as analytically proven in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 For a given threshold ability of risky entrepreneurs ￿￿, better investor protec-







Proof. See the Appendix.
The second term in (4) captures the ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect, whereby investor protection
may increase inequality. This happens to the extent that the marginal risky entrepreneurs
make the earnings distribution more dispersed, that is if the earnings of agents with ability
￿￿ di⁄er enough from the average. Lemma 5 proves analytically that investor protection
tends to increase inequality through the ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect, provided that ￿￿ is su¢ ciently
high.13
Lemma 5 Necessary condition for @V ar=@￿￿ < 0 is that the threshold in the absence of
investor protection, ￿￿

























Proof. See the Appendix.
The overall impact of investor protection on income inequality depends on the strength
of the ￿risk sharing￿and ￿risk taking￿e⁄ects. In particular, when the cost of misreporting,
and hence the size of the risky sector, is close to its maximum, the ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect is
weak, since the marginal entrepreneurs do not add much to the existing mass of risky ￿rms.
The ￿risk sharing￿e⁄ect is instead very strong since it applies to nearly all potential risky
entrepreneurs, and hence an increase in p reduces inequality. When investor protection is
very low, there is a small mass of risky ￿rms in the economy and hence the ￿risk taking￿
e⁄ect is stronger at the margin, while the ￿risk sharing￿e⁄ect is weak since it applies to
few entrepreneurs. It follows that inequality may be a non-monotonic function of investor
protection, as proven in Proposition 1.
13Notice that this conditon is always satis￿ed if the cash￿ ow in the bad state is non-positive, i.e., ’A ￿ 1.
16Proposition 1 Provided that Lemma 5 holds, the variance of the earnings distribution is










Proof. See the Appendix.
Since, from Corollary 1, the relative weight of equity-like instruments in overall exter-
nal ￿nance, ￿, is continuous and monotonic in investor protection, also the relationship
between ￿ and income inequality follows the non-monotonic pattern of Proposition 1,
to the extent that the variation in ￿nancial structure is driven by changes in investor
protection.
Proposition 2 For given parameters {A, B, ’} and ability distribution G(￿), and pro-
vided that Lemma 5 holds, the variance of the earnings distribution is increasing in the
relative weight of equity-like instruments in overall external ￿nance, ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ G(￿￿), for










Proof. See the Appendix.
After characterizing analytically the main forces driving the relationship between in-
vestor protection and inequality, it is useful to pause and consider whether changing some
assumptions would a⁄ect the results. First, ability is assumed to a⁄ect productivity only
when the entrepreneur chooses the risky technology. If this assumption was relaxed, the
qualitative results are likely to hold as long as the expected marginal return to ability is
lower in the safe than in the risky sector. Intuitively, in this case, the ability-earnings
schedule of safe entrepreneurs in Figure 1 would feature, instead of a ￿ at line, a straight
one with lower slope and higher intercept than that of risky entrepreneurs. While this
would raise the degree of inequality under p = 0, and may weaken the ￿risk taking￿ef-
fect, it does not seem to change the forces giving rise to the non-monotonic relationship
between investor protection and inequality.14
The ￿nancial friction in the model is given by ex-post asymmetric information about
entrepreneurial outcomes, generating a moral hazard problem. It may be argued though
14What may change is the parameter restriction in Lemma 5, but not the fact that the ￿risk taking￿
e⁄ect is more likely to dominate at low levels of investor protection and the ￿risk sharing￿e⁄ect becomes
stronger as p increases.
17that credit markets are also subject to ex-ante asymmetric information on the quality of
the borrowers, which may give rise to adverse selection. If in addition ability was ex-
ante unobservable, investors would have to induce entrepreneurs to truthfully reveal it by
o⁄ering them a menu of ￿nancial contracts such that agents with a certain level of ability
would be worse o⁄ declaring a higher ￿, since earnings are proportional to it. Therefore,
the degree of risk sharing would be decreasing in ability. This may weaken both the
￿risk sharing￿and the ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect. While adding this friction to the model would
complicate the analytical characterization, it does not seem to qualitatively a⁄ect the
forces behind the non-monotonic relationship between investor protection and inequality,
since the risk taking e⁄ect would still be stronger at low levels of investor protection and
risk sharing would dominate at high levels.
Finally, the assumption of ￿xed capital requirement implies that entrepreneurs only
decide whether to take risk or not (extensive margin), but not how much risk to take
(intensive margin). In reality, the degree of entrepreneurial risk taking varies along both
margins, and it is therefore meaningful to wonder how the results would change if also
the intensive margin was introduced in the model. Castro et al. (2004) show, within a
similar framework, that investor protection may have an ambiguous e⁄ect on the intensive
margin of risk taking (i.e. continuous capital investment in the risky technology). Hence,
it is not a priori obvious whether introducing the intensive margin would strengthen or
weaken the ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect. Moreover, the presence of the intensive margin is unlikely
to alter the ￿risk sharing￿e⁄ect.
3.2 Numerical solution
Although intuitive, the full characterization of inequality as a function of investor protec-
tion is awkward to derive analytically, given the highly non-linear expression for V ar(w).
Solving the model numerically allows me to easily compute alternative measures of in-
equality and study how they vary with the parameter p. To this end, I assume that utility
is logaritmic and the ability distribution is lognormal with mean and variance taken from
the actual distribution of years of schooling for the US, and set the technological para-
meters (A, B and ’) so as to satisfy the model restrictions.15 First, I solve the model
under di⁄erent riskiness parameters to generate variation in the threshold ability ￿￿ for
given investor protection.16 Based on the earnings distributions derived numerically, I
15This numerical solution has no quantitative aim. All details are given in the Appendix.
16Recall that, as predicted by Lemma 2 the ability of the marginal risky entrepreneur, ￿
￿, is increasing
in investor protection (p) and decreasing in technological riskiness. Alternatively, I could assume a CRRA
utility function and let the risk aversion parameter vary. The results, available upon request, are analogous.























































Figure 2: Investor Protection and Income Inequality.
then compute two indicators of inequality, the variance and the Gini coe¢ cient, and plot
them against investor protection in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that both measures of inequality may be non-monotonic in investor
protection. Note ￿rst that in the simulation for low risk, nearly all entrepreneurs choose
the risky technology independently of investor protection, so that the necessary condition
of Lemma 5 is violated and the ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect is not at work. Only in this special case,
inequality is unambiguously decreasing in p. When Lemma 5 holds, for higher riskiness,
inequality is increasing in investor protection when p is su¢ ciently low, and becomes
decreasing when investor protection gets high enough. The ￿risk sharing￿ channel is
e⁄ectively illustrated by the downward-sloping lines for the low-risk technology, which
exhibit a sharp decline in inequality associated to an increase in p when nearly all ￿rms
adopt the risky technology independently of investor protection. The ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect
is instead captured by the initial upward-sloping part of the lines for the middle and high
risk cases, and by the fact that, for any value of p, inequality is higher when the riskiness
is lower and hence risk taking is larger.
4 Optimality and political viability of investor protection
In the model, perfect investor protection is ex-ante Pareto e¢ cient, since it raises both
aggregate income and the expected utility of all agents. This is due to the absence of
costs, which implies that the level of investor protection that both the social planner
and individual agents would chose is p = 1. In the real world however, we do not observe
perfect investor protection, and reforms aimed at improving it may be opposed by di⁄erent
interest groups in the society, as argued by the literature on the political determinants of
19￿nancial institutions (see Rajan and Zingales, 2003, Perotti and von Thadden, 2005 and
Pagano and Volpin, 2005, among others).
Assuming that enforcing investor protection entails a cost, c(p) with c0 (￿) > 0, e.g.
given by the monitoring and judicial activities, would immediately imply that a benevolent
social planner would choose imperfect investor protection. The reason is that the marginal
value of investor protection,











tends to zero for p = 1. Moreover, if the cost has to be ￿nanced through uniform lump-sum
taxation, even a socially optimal p < 1 could be politically di¢ cult to implement because
there would be a constituency against it. In particular, an increase in investor protection
would be opposed by the least and the most able agents since they would bear the cost
withouth enjoying enough bene￿t from risk sharing. In other words, the constituency
against investor protection would be formed by the more productive, and ex-post richer,
incumbents of the risky sector and the least able outsiders, which recalls the result in
Pagano and Volpin (2006) that managers may form a coalition with workers to oppose the
reform. Interestingly, if investor protection was chosen according to the preferences of a
median voter who would always choose the safe project, the prevailing p would be zero!
In the model, the entry of new entrepreneurs in the risky sector does not a⁄ect the
payo⁄s for the incumbents. If the safe technology was assumed to be employed to produce
a homogeneous ￿nal good, while the risky one produced di⁄erentiated intermediate goods,
entry would erode the pro￿ts of risky incumbents, thereby giving them an additional reason
to oppose the reform, as suggested, for instance, by Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Perotti
and Volpin (2007). Safe entrepreneurs, on the other hand, might bene￿t from the increased
competition in the risky sector, and therefore switch in favor of better investor protection
if this gain outweighed its cost.
The model also abstracts from wealth heterogeneity, so that the ex-post income dis-
tribution, only depends on ability, investor protection and luck. If wealth heterogeneity
was introduced, the implications for income inequality would become more complicated
to derive. Yet, more insights may arise for the political economy of investor protection,
because the composition of the constituencies considered above would also be a⁄ected
by wealth. On the one hand richer agents, as entrepreneurs do not bene￿t much from
investor protection since safe returns from investment account for a larger part of their
total income. On the other hand, as investors, they would bene￿t from the e⁄ect that
20investor protection might have on the interest rate.17
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I evaluate empirically the main theoretical predictions derived in section 3.
Since investor protection is generally determined by law, it is not expected to exhibit large
variation across geographical areas or sectors within a country. Hence, cross-country data,
possibly with time variation, seem more appropriate for empirical purpose. First, I assess
the overall relationship between investor protection and income inequality on a cross-
section of 47 countries over the period 1980-2000 using a time-invariant de jure indicator
of investor protection and a general measure of income inequality. Next, I show that the
prediction in Corollary 1 is supported by the data since, as in La Porta et al. (2006),
the ￿nancial structure of a country is more oriented towards equity relative to debt, the
higher its degree of investor protection. I then take to the data the result of Proposition
2 and estimate the relationship between ￿nancial structure and inequality on a wider
cross-section of 67 countries and a panel of 58 countries with 5-year observations between
1976 and 2000. Moreover, I show that the main result holds even when considering only
inequality at the top of the income distribution, and that risk taking, captured by ￿rm
entry, is positively correlated with inequality as predicted by the model. Finally, I show
that the results are speci￿c to investor protection and ￿nancial structure, as predicted by
the model, and do not apply to more general indicators of ￿nancial development.
5.1 Data
The ￿rst empirical task is to measure the main variables of interest: inequality and investor
protection. In most of the analysis, I proxy the dependent variable, inequality, with
the Gini coe¢ cient of the income distribution which is a widely used measure and is
available for a relatively large sample of countries and years. I take the data from Dollar
and Kraay￿ s (2002) database that relies on four sources: the UN-WIDER World Income
Inequality Database, the ￿high quality￿sample from Deininger and Squire (1996), Chen
and Ravallion (2001), and Lundberg and Squire (2000).18 Although the theory proposed in
17As shown in Bon￿glioli (2005), in a general equilibrium version of the model, investor protection would
raise productivity and hence the interest rate.
18The original sample consists of 953 observations, which reduce to 418 separated by at least ￿ve years,
on 137 countries over the period 1950-1999. Countries di⁄er with respect to the survey coverage (national
vs subnational), the welfare measure (income vs expenditure), the measure of income (net vs gross) and the
unit of observation (households vs individuals). For better comparability, data from Deininger and Squire
are usually adjusted by adding 6.6 to the Gini coe¢ cients based on expenditure. Here, the adjustment
was made in a slightly more complicated way to account for the variety of sources; see Dollar and Kraay
(2002) for details.
21the paper refers to entrepreneurs, who usually belong to the top percentiles of the income
distribution, three arguments may justify the use of a general indicator of inequality.19
First, recent evidence from several countries shows that a large fraction of the variation
in income inequality over the last two decades is explained by changes at the top of
the distribution (see, among others, Atkinson et al., 2009 and Heathcote et al., 2010),
which suggests that the e⁄ects of investor protection on inequality at the top of the
distribution are likely to show up even on data for the entire population. Second, employees
normally earn higher wages and are subject to higher employment risk when working in
more productive and riskier ￿rms.20 Hence the results obtained for entrepreneurs may be
expected to trickle down to all workers. Finally, the model could be interpreted as one of
occupational choice ￿ la Kihlstrom and La⁄ont (1979), where each agent can either be a
worker receiving a ￿xed wage or an entrepreneur facing risk. In this case, the implications
on earnings inequality refer to the entire population.
Yet, to assess the robustness of my empirical results to the measure of inequality, I
replicate part of the analysis using the data on top income percentiles collected by Alvaredo
et al. (2011). Unfortunately, these data are available for a limited number of countries
(23 in the data release of March 2011), though over a reasonably long time-spam, which
restricts my sample to 16 countries with 5-year observations from 1976 to 2004. Proxying
inequality with the ratio of the average income of the top 1 and 0.1 per cent over the one
of the top 10 per cent of the income distribution, I obtain the same results, in line with
the model predictions.
As regards the main explanatory variable, I ￿rst consider a de jure measure of investor
protection, i.e., the index of shareholder protection compiled by La Porta et al. (2006),
that takes values between 0 (no protection) and 10 (maximum protection). This index is
available for 49 developed and developing countries and has no time variation, which is
its main limitation.
Next, I adopt an alternative approach and evaluate the predictions of the model in
two steps. I ￿rst take to the data Corollary 1, arguing that the relative weight of equity in
external ￿nance should be a positive function of investor protection, and then Proposition
2, establishing the non-monotonic relationship between the indicator of ￿nancial structure
19This would be a serious concern if investor protection a⁄ected inequality among the poor in the same
way as predicted by the model, but through a di⁄erent channel, thereby generating a bias in favor of the
model. If, however, there was no e⁄ect, or an opposite one, this would just be a source of attenuation bias.
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Figure 3: Investor Protection and the Financial Structure from a cross-section of 47 coun-
tries, 1980-2000.
and inequality.21 The advantage of this strategy is that it allows me to enlarge the cross-
sectional dimension and to exploit the time variation, since data on inequality and ￿nancial
structure are available for a large number of countries and years. In particular, I proxy
the size of the stock market relative to overall external ￿nance with the ratio of stock
market capitalization over credit to the private sector, where the data on stock market
capitalization and credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP are taken from the
2009 update of the database on Financial Development and Structure by Beck et al.
(2000). A preliminary data inspection lends graphical support to this two-step procedure.
Consistently with the empirical evidence in La Porta et al. (2006), the plot in Figure
3 suggests that better investor protection is associated to a larger relative size of the
stock market.22 Figure 4 plots instead ￿ve-year observations of the Ginis against relative
stock market size. Despite showing unconditional correlations only, it is suggestive of a
non-monotonic relationship, as predicted by the model.23
21In the model, ￿nancial structure varies with other parameters, as summarized in Corollary 1. These
variables may only a⁄ect quantitatively but not qualitatively the non-monotonicity of the relation between
investor protection and inequality through ￿nancial structure, for instance by determining where its sign
is inverted.
22The OLS and IV regressions reported in the next subsection con￿rm that the correlation between
investor protection and the ratio of stock market capitalization over private credit is positive and signi￿cant.
23In the regression analysis, the non-monotonicity is shown to be statistically signi￿cant and robust to
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Figure 4: Financial Structure and Income Inequality from a panel of 58 countries, 1976-
2000.
Finally, since risk taking is an important determinant of inequality in the model, it
would be desirable to also control for it in the empirical analysis. I take data on ￿rm
entry as a proxy for the extensive margin of entrepreneurial risk taking and control for
it in the speci￿cations for inequality among top income levels. Entry is computed as
the percentage annual growth rate in the number of establishments as reported by the
UNIDO database. The main shortcoming with this control variable is the time span it
covers. Although data are available for up to 116 countries, observations start in the late
Nineties for most countries in the sample, which makes the overlap with the Ginis too
limited for econometric analysis.
Other control variables are human capital, proxied by the share of population aged
above 25 years with completed secondary education from Barro and Lee (2000, updated
in 2010), real per capita GDP, government expenditure and trade as a share of GDP from
the Penn World Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009).
When combining the data sources for the main dependent and explanatory variables,
I am left with two cross-sections of 47 and 67 countries and two unbalanced panels of 58
and 16 countries observed over the period 1976-2004.
245.2 Cross-sectional Estimates
First, I focus on the cross-section of 47 countries and estimate with Ordinary Least Squares
the following equation for the overall e⁄ect of investor protection on inequality:
Ginii = ￿0 + ￿1IPi + ￿2IP ￿ IP_HIGH + ￿3Xi + ￿i; (5)
where Gini is the measure of income inequality, i is the country index, IP is the indicator of
investor protection, IP_HIGH is a dummy taking value one for IP above the median, X
is a vector of control variables, and ￿ is the error term.24 Following the empirical literature
on income inequality, I include in X the log of the real per capita GDP and its square to
account for the Kuznets￿hypothesis, the share of population above 25 years that completed
secondary education (from Barro and Lee, 2001) to control for education, government
expenditure as a ratio of GDP to account for the degree of redistribution, and total trade
(Export+Import) as a ratio of GDP. All variables are expressed in period average for
the period 1980-2000. The model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between investor
protection and inequality, which is consistent with a positive ￿1 and a negative ￿2 < 0.
Table 1 reports the estimated coe¢ cients. In column 1, I only control for investor
protection and education and obtain a non signi￿cant ￿1, suggesting that there is no clear
correlation. As soon as I allow for non-linearity in investor protection, I obtain signi￿cant
coe¢ cients with the expected sign: positive ￿1 and negative ￿2. These results hold if I
control for real GDP per capita and its square, government expenditure and trade over
GDP, in columns 3 and 4. In column 5, the dummy capturing the non linearity accounts
for observations of IP above the 60th percentile instead of the median. Although more
imprecise, the coe¢ cients maintain the expected signs. To correct for possible simultaneity,
in columns 6 and 7, I take the last available observation of the Gini coe¢ cient for each
country and regress it on the same variables as in columns 2 and 3. The estimates are
qualitatively and quantitatively very close to the ones for period averages. These results
suggest that the relationship between investor protection and income inequality is non-
monotonic in the way predicted by the model.
In the model, investor protection a⁄ects income inequality through its e⁄ect on the
￿nancial structure of the economy, which in turn a⁄ects entrepreneurial risk taking and
thereby income realizations. I evaluate whether better investor protection tilts the ￿nancial
24The countries in this sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Den-
mark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, China, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
25structure towards equity rather than debt by estimating the following equation:
SMi = a0 + a1IPi + a2Zi + ei;
where SM is the ratio of stock market capitalization over total credit to the private sector,
Z is a vector of control variables, and e is the error term. Data are averaged over the
period 1980-2000. Following La Porta et al. (2006), I include in Z the real per capita GDP
and an index of e¢ ciency of the judiciary system (e⁄_jud from La Porta et al., 2006). I
￿rst estimate the equation above with OLS and then, to control for possible endogeneity
of investor protection with respect to relative stock market size, with Two-Stages Least
Squares instrumenting investor protection with dummies for UK, French and German legal
origins. The results, reported in Table 2, exhibit positive and signi￿cant estimates of a1
both with OLS and 2SLS Instrumental Variables. This is in line both with Corollary 1
and with the evidence in La Porta et al. (2006).
Next, I turn to the second step and consider the relationship between ￿nancial structure
and inequality on a wider cross-section.25 In particular, I estimate the following equation
Ginii = ~ ￿0 + ~ ￿1SMi + ~ ￿2 (SMi)
2 + ~ ￿3Xi + ￿i;
and report the results in Table 3. The estimates con￿rm that human capital plays an
important role at reducing inequality and lend support to the Kuznets hypothesis of
an inverse-U shaped relationship between per capita income and inequality. The most
novel result, however, is that ￿nancial structure seems to be an important, yet so far
overlooked, covariate of inequality. In particular the signi￿cant estimates of a positive ~ ￿1
and a negative ~ ￿2, are consistent with the model prediction. The fact that the results are
robust to controlling for per capita GDP and its square reassures that the non-monotonic
relationship between relative stock market size and inequality is not spuriously driven by
the level of income of a country. Robustness to the inclusion of government expenditure
in columns 4 and 8 also suggests that the results in the previous columns are not driven
by redistributive policies or openness to trade, which may be correlated with ￿nancial
structure. As in Table 1, to correct for a possible simultaneity, in columns 5-8, I take
the last available observation of the Gini coe¢ cient for each country and regress it on the
25The countries in this sample are: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia.
26same variables as in columns 1-4. The estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively very
close to the ones for period averages. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that an
increase in the relative size of the stock market should reduce inequality only after getting
to a level (between 1.34 and 1.53) that only a few countries have reached in the sample.
5.3 Panel Estimates
The time-series variation in the data on ￿nancial structure allow me to better exploit
the information contained in the time-varying data for inequality, and estimate with least
squares the following equation:
Giniit = ￿0 + ￿1SMit + ￿2 (SMit)
2 + ￿3Xit + ￿it; (6)
where time subscripts refer to non-overlapping 5-year periods between 1976 and 2000,
all regressors are the same as described above, and ￿it is the error term. I estimate
equation (6) both considering ￿it as a random e⁄ect, thereby exploiting both time and
cross-sectional variation, and under the assumption that ￿it = ￿i + "it where ￿i is the
country ￿xed e⁄ect. In the second case, the link between ￿nancial structure and inequality
is identi￿ed out of within-country variation. In both cases, the reported standard errors
are clustered by country and robust. A positive estimate for ￿1 and a negative one for
￿2 would be consistent with the model prediction that better investor protection, by
raising the weight of stocks in the ￿nancial structure, tends to increase inequality until it
becomes high enough so that the risk sharing e⁄ect dominates thereby inverting the sign
of the relationship.
The results are reported in Table 4.26 The ￿rst two rows tend to con￿rm the result
of Table 3, that inequality is non monotonic, as suggested by the model, in the relative
size of the stock market, although the positive estimate for ￿1 is now signi￿cant even
when I do not control for the quadratic term. This pattern is robust to controlling for
common determinants of inequality such as real per capita GDP, government expenditure
and openness to trade. The regressions in colunms 5 and 10 suggest that the results are not
sensitive to the exclusion of Ghana, which appears as an outlier in Figure 4. Notice that
the results of positive ￿1 and, especially, negative ￿2 hold stronger when the coe¢ cients
26The countries in this sample are: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras,
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Luxem-
bourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States, Venezuela, Zambia.
27are estimated with random e⁄ects. This makes the evidence more consistent with the
predictions of the model, because the cross-sectional variation in SM, accounted for in
these speci￿cation, is more likely to be generated by di⁄erences in investor protection than
time-series changes.
The evidence presented so far is obtained using a broad measure of inequality, based
on the entire income distribution, while it may be argued that the model applies to en-
trepreneurs who are more likely to belong to the top end of the income distribution. I
address this concern by estimating equation (6) for two indicators of income inequality
among the rich, such as the ratio of the average income of the top 1 (or 0.1) over the top
10 per cent of the income distribution. Note that data availability is limited to a max-
imum of 16 OECD countries, observed between 1976 and 2004.27 The results, reported
in Table 5, are consistent with the ones obtained for the Gini coe¢ cients, suggesting the
existence of a non-monotonic relationship whereby inequality increases with the relative
size of the stock market up to a certain point and then decreases with it. Using the same
restricted sample of OECD countries I am also able to account for the role of risk taking,
which is what drives the positive e⁄ect of investor protection on inequality in the model.
In particular, in columns 3 and 6-8, I add to the speci￿cation the annual growth rate of
establishments, as a proxy of ￿rm entry, capturing the extensive margin of risk taking.
Consistently with the theory, the estimates for entry are positive and tend to reduce the
size and signi￿cance of the linear coe¢ cients for relative stock market size, suggesting that
its positive correlation with inequality is driven by a higher exposition to risk.
5.4 Financial Structure vs Financial Development
The results in this section document the existence of a non-monotonic relationship be-
tween investor protection, ￿nancial structure, and income inequality, both measured on
the overall population and at the top of the income distribution. This evidence is ro-
bust and consistent with the model proposed in sections 2 and 3. Here, I assess whether
the relationship found in the data refers speci￿cally to investor protection and ￿nancial
structure, or it captures a more general pattern linking inequality to ￿nancial develop-
ment, which could be consistent with alternative theories. To this end, I add to the main
speci￿cations de jure indicators of creditors￿rights, taking values between 0 and 4 (from
Djankov et al., 2007), and e¢ ciency of the judiciary, and control separately for the size of
the stock market and total credit to the private sector, which is commonly taken as a de
facto measure of ￿nancial depth. The results are reported in Tables 6 and 7.
27These countries are: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
28In Table 6, columns 1-2 report the content of columns 1-2 of Table 1, while columns 3-4
replicate it adding the two de jure indicators of institutional and ￿nancial development.
The coe¢ cients for investor protection remain unchanged, while the new variables are not
signi￿cantly correlated with inequality. Column 5, reports column 1 of Table 2, regressing
relative stock market size on investor protection, and column 6 replicates it adding the
de jure index of ￿nancial development. Note that creditors￿rights are not signi￿cantly
correlated with ￿nancial structure, which may explain the result of columns 1-4 in light of
the model. Since the general indicators of ￿nancial and institutional development are not
related to ￿nancial structure, and hence to entrepreneurial risk taking, they do not relate
to inequality either.
In columns 1-4 of Table 7, I replicate the estimates of Table 4, columns 1-2 and 6-7,
splitting SM in stock market capitalization and credit to the private sector expressed as
ratios of GDP. The results suggest that, while ￿nancial depth alone (PRIVO) tends to be
associated to lower inequality, as found by Beck et al. (2007) and Clarke et al. (2006), it
is a higher weight of equities in the ￿nancial structure that may correlate positively with
inequality, as long as SM is not so large that the sign of the relationship gets inverted.
Finally, given that the de jure indicator of creditors￿right exhibits some time variation, I
add it to the panel speci￿cations of Table 4, columns 2 and 7. The coe¢ cients reported
in columns 5 and 6, consistently with the previous results, suggest that income inequality
correlates in opposite ways with ￿nancial structure and indicators of overall ￿nancial
development.
The evidence in Tables 6 and 7 points to the fact that the non-monotonic relationship
between investor protection, ￿nancial structure and inequality does not generalize to other,
more general, measures of ￿nancial development.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides theoretical and empirical support for a systematic relationship be-
tween investor protection, ￿nancial structure and income inequality. While there are
contributions addressing the e⁄ects of investor protection on ￿nancial structure and eco-
nomic growth through risk sharing and risk taking, little attention has been paid to the
implications for income distribution. To ￿ll this gap, I develop a simple static model with
risk-averse agents, heterogeneous in their ability, that can produce using either a safe or
a risky technology. I assume that entrepreneurs have to borrow funds in order to start
their business, and that there are ￿nancial frictions, arising from the non-observability of
a ￿rm￿ s cash-￿ ow to investors.
In this framework, I study how investor protection, by alleviating frictions, a⁄ects
29optimal ￿nancial contracts, the technological choice of agents with di⁄erent ability and
the distribution of their earnings. Better investor protection a⁄ects income inequality
in two opposite ways. By improving risk sharing between entrepreneurs and ￿nanciers,
it reduces income volatility. On the other hand, by inducing more agents to choose the
risky technology, it may increase the dispersion of the earnings realizations. The ￿rst,
￿risk sharing￿ , e⁄ect reduces inequality, while ￿risk taking￿tends to raise it. The overall
impact of investor protection on inequality is shown to be non-monotonic. In particular,
the ￿risk taking￿e⁄ect dominates at low levels of investor protection, and is outweighed by
￿risk sharing￿when investor protection is high. In the empirical section, I provide evidence
from a cross-section of up to sixty seven countries and a panel of up to ￿fty-eight countries
over the period 1976-2004 that is consistent with the main theoretical predictions.
The model is deliberately kept simple to emphasize the mechanism linking investor
protection to income inequality. It follows that its implications for economic performance
and welfare may appear simplistic: aggregate income increases with investor protection
due to risk taking, and welfare increases due to higher output and better risk sharing. Yet,
an interesting insight is that investor protection, through its positive e⁄ect on aggregate
output and the non-monotonic impact on inequality, generates a Kuznets￿curve. Contrary
to existing models, this inverse-U shaped relationship between GDP and inequality is gen-
erated by the development of ￿nancial institutions, rather than by wealth accumulation.
Moreover, as discussed in paper, the model may be easily modi￿ed to address a number
of issues, such as the political economy of ￿nancial institutions.
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34A Proofs
Lemma 1
The assumptions that A > B + 1 > ’A and u0 > 0, imply that agents with ￿ = 1
always choose the risky technology since V R(1) = u(wH (1)) = u(A ￿ 1) > u(B) = V S;
while agents with ￿ = 0 always make the safe choice since V R(0) = u(wL (0)) = u(’A￿
1) < V S. To prove that there exist a unique ability ￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that V R(￿) < (>)
V S for all ￿ > (<) ￿￿, I just need to show that V R is increasing in ￿. The derivative of




















since wH (￿) > wL (￿). Therefore, there exist a unique threshold ability ￿￿ such that










To prove that the threshold ability is decreasing in investor protection, I characterize
￿￿ as implicit function of p,
V R (￿￿;p) = V S;











To prove that this derivative is negative, I just need to show that @V R
@p is positive, since
by Lemma 1 @V R



















(1 ￿ ’)A ￿ 0;





@p = 0 since lim
p!1
wH (￿) = lim
p!1
wL (￿) = wS.







































[’ + ￿p(1 ￿ ’) + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ’)]





















= u0 (B ￿ 1) > 0:
Corollary 1
The derivative of ￿ w.r.t. ￿￿ is
@￿
@￿￿ = ￿g (￿￿) ￿ 0:









@’ < 0 by Lemma 2.









@B > 0 by Lemma 2.









@p < 0 by Lemma 2.









@A < 0 by Lemma 2.
Lemma 3
The derivative of average entrepreneurial earnings w.r.t. ￿￿ is
@E[w]
@￿￿ = g (￿￿)
￿
wS ￿ ￿￿wH (￿￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)wL (￿￿)
￿
￿ 0;
since, by risk aversion and the de￿nition of ￿￿, wS ￿ ￿￿wH (￿￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)wL (￿￿).
Lemma 4













which becomes, after simplifying and replacing for wH, wL, @wH
@p = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ’)A
and @wL
@p = ￿ (1 ￿ ’)A,
@V ar
@p




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)g (￿)d￿ ￿ 0:
To prove that this derivative is higher the higher is the threshold ability ￿￿, I obtain the






@￿￿ = 2(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ’)
2 A2￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)g (￿) ￿ 0:
Lemma 5
Derive the partial derivative of V ar(w) w.r.t. the threshold, ￿￿:
@V ar
@￿￿ = g (￿￿)￿￿ ￿
wL (￿￿) ￿ wH (￿￿)
￿￿




wS ￿ wL (￿￿)
￿￿
wS + wL (￿￿) ￿ 2E[w]
￿
This is positive, @V ar
@￿￿ > 0, i⁄
￿￿ ￿
wH (￿￿) ￿ wL (￿￿)
￿￿




wS ￿ wL (￿￿)
￿￿
2E[w] ￿ wS ￿ wL (￿￿)
￿
> 0;
37that is, since both 2E[w] ￿ wS ￿ wL (￿￿) and wH (￿￿) ￿ wL (￿￿) are positive, i⁄:
￿￿2E[w] ￿ wH (￿￿) ￿ wL (￿￿)
2E[w] ￿ wS ￿ wL (￿￿)
￿
wS ￿ wL (￿￿)
wH (￿￿) ￿ wL (￿￿)
> 0;
i.e.,
0 < ￿￿ G(￿￿)(B ￿ ’A) + ’A + A(1 ￿ ’)
R 1
￿￿ ￿g (￿)d￿ ￿ ’A ￿ ￿￿pA(1 ￿ ’)
G(￿￿)(B ￿ ’A) + ’A + A(1 ￿ ’)
R 1
￿￿ ￿g (￿)d￿ ￿ 1
2 [B + ’A + ￿￿pA(1 ￿ ’)]
￿
￿￿
2 (1 ￿ p)A(1 ￿ ’)
G(￿￿)(B ￿ ’A) + ’A + A(1 ￿ ’)
R 1
￿￿ ￿g (￿)d￿ ￿ 1
2 [B + ’A + ￿￿pA(1 ￿ ’)]
￿
B ￿ ’A ￿ ￿￿pA(1 ￿ ’)
(1 ￿ p)A(1 ￿ ’)
:
Multiplying and dividing by A(1 ￿ ’); and substituting (B ￿ ’A)=A(1 ￿ ’) = ￿￿
p=1 (the



















which holds for the threshold ￿￿ high enough relative to its ￿rst-best value, ￿￿
p=1. Since
the highest ￿￿ is associated to p = 0, necessary condition for the existence of at least one
value of p so that @V ar
















0 ￿g (￿)d￿ ￿ 1=2
:
Proposition 1
Compute the limit of dV ar
dp at the extreme values of p. For p ! 0, ￿￿ ! ￿￿
p=0 satisfying
Lemma 5, so that limp!0
@V ar
















































For p ! 1, wH (￿) ! wL (￿) for any ￿ ￿ ￿￿, and wH (￿￿) = wL (￿￿) = wS, hence
@￿￿
@p ! 0, @V ar
@￿￿ ! 0 and dV ar
dp ! 0. To verify that it approaches zero from above, express
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￿ (1 ￿ ￿)g (￿)d￿ < 0:
Proposition 2
For given parameters and ability distribution, the derivative of the variance of earnings



































As p ! 1,
d￿
dp ! 0 since @￿￿





= (p ￿ 1)
d2V ar
d￿dp



























which is negative since d2V ar
(dp)2 > 0, limp!1
dV ar
dp < 0 from Proposition 1,
d￿
dp > 0 from
Corollary 1, and limp!1
d2￿
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This section describes step by step the procedure I followed for solving numerically the
model of sections 2 and 3
1. Set values for the main parameters: A=4; B=2; ’=[0.251 0.3 0.46], r=1.
2. Compute values for the parameters of the Lognormal distribution of abilities, (￿;￿),
from Barro and Lee￿ s (2000) data. The database provides observations for the per-
centages of the population aged 15 and above with no, primary, secondary and
tertiary education (lu, lp, ls, lh), along with the average year of each education level
(pyr, syr, hyr). I compute the average years of schooling for people with primary,
secondary and tertiary education (q1, q2, q3, respectively):
q1 =
pyr
lp + ls + lh
;q2 = q1 +
syr
ls + lh












li (qi ￿ E (Q))
2 ;
with l0 = lu, l1 = lp, l2 = ls and l3 = lh. Finally, ￿ and ￿ can be derived from the
expressions for mean and variance of the Lognormal distribution:
E (Q) = e￿+ ￿2
2
V (Q) = e2￿+2￿2
￿ e￿+￿2
:






(a) De￿ne a grid of 101 degrees of investor protection p 2 [0;1], and a grid of initial





, equally spaced by 0.00005 (the
￿ner the grid, the better the approximation).
(b) Draw ￿ =100001 ability levels from a Lognormal (￿;￿) and sort them in ascend-
ing order. Identify the ability level ￿:999: G(￿:999) = 0:999 and divide every
￿ ￿ ￿:999 by this ￿gure. Replace all ￿ > ￿:999 by 1, so that the distribution is
normalized to values included in [0;1], and truncated in a way that makes the
top 0.1 per cent of the population successful with certainty. Compute the Cdf
of ability,
G(￿i) =
# of realizations ￿ ￿ ￿i
￿
:
(c) For each degree of investor protection p
i. compute ￿￿ (p) as the solution to the technology choice problem. In par-
ticular, recursively ￿nd the point in the grid of ￿￿ satisfying:








with wH (￿￿) and wL (￿￿) de￿ned by (1) and (2)
ii. for every ability ￿




A[￿￿p(1 ￿ ’) + ’ + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ’)￿] ￿ r
￿ < ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ Bi(N;￿), with N = # of ￿ ￿ ￿￿:
B. sort w and derive its cumulative density function as F (wi) =
# of realizations w￿wi
￿
C. compute the variance of
D. compute the Lorenz Curve as L(wm) = mean of w￿wm
mean of w
m
￿ for m = 1;2;:::￿





iii. save the threshold, the variance and the Gini in (1 ￿ p) vectors, ￿￿ (p),
V ar(w(p)), and Gini(p)
411 234567
IP 0.128 2.004** 2.370*** 2.253** 0.585 2.215** 2.427***
[0.457] [0.959] [0.844] [0.855] [0.736] [1.015] [0.893]
IP_HIGH -1.562** -1.796*** -1.717** -0.354 -1.713** -1.852**
[0.724] [0.664] [0.651] [0.612] [0.781] [0.710]
SCHOOL -0.260*** -0.251*** -0.07 -0.063 -0.059 -0.260*** -0.03
[0.076] [0.071] [0.097] [0.112] [0.102] [0.091] [0.134]
LRGDP 124.462*** 129.804*** 114.407*** 152.672***
[31.944] [33.031] [38.293] [34.153]
LRGDP^2 -7.201*** -7.522*** -6.674*** -8.862***





R^2 0.237 0.31 0.519 0.536 0.433 0.274 0.533
Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 47
Gini year 1980-2000 1980-2000 1980- 2000 1980- 2000 1980- 2000
last obs. last obs.














Note: the dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution. The regressors
are: IP= investor protection, IP_HIGH= IP*dummy for IP>median (60th percentile in column 5),
SCHOOL= share of people above 25 years with completed secondary education, LRGDP(2)=
log of real per capita GDP (squared), GOV= government expenditure, TRADE=
(import+export)/GDP. Estimation is performed with Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard
errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level.
Table 1. Investor Protection and Income Inequality (Gini) - Cross-section 1980-2000123
OLS 2SLS - 2nd 
stage




LRGDP -0.05 -0.053 0.574
[0.058] [0.071] [0.510]
EFF_JUD 0.053* 0.054* -0.011
[0.028] [0.032] [0.231]
UK legal origin 2.728**
[1.185]
FR legal origin -1.22
[1.250]
GE legal origin -1.448
[1.373]
R^2 0.327 0.282 0.497
Sargan over-id 0.202
Wu-Hausman F 0.898
Countries 46 46 46








Table 2. Investor Protection and Financial 
Structure - Cross-section 1980-2000
Note: the dependent variable is either SM=stock
market capitalization as ratio of credit to the private
sector or IP= index of investor protection, as specified.
The regressors are: IP, LRGDP= log of real per capita
GDP, EFF_JUD= index of efficiency of the judiciary
and legal origins. Estimation is performed with
Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stages Least
Squares. Robust standard errors are reported in
brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 per cent
significance level. P-values are reported for the
Sargan test of over-identification and the Wu-
Hausman test of endogeneity.1 2 3 45678
SM 3.292 11.459** 12.415** 13.487*** 3.603 13.636*** 15.402*** 16.809***
[2.350] [4.395] [4.890] [4.758] [2.774] [4.775] [5.211] [5.076]
SM^2 -4.146** -4.125* -4.398** -5.093*** -5.460** -5.739***
[1.677] [2.260] [2.019] [1.782] [2.381] [2.078]
SCHOOL -0.187*** -0.215*** -0.056 0.002 -0.191** -0.226*** -0.028 0.029
[0.062] [0.066] [0.072] [0.078] [0.077] [0.080] [0.092] [0.098]
LRGDP 33.089 46.268* 32.287 48.162*
[24.631] [23.589] [25.307] [24.330]
LRGDP^2 -2.054 -2.872** -2.063 -3.034**





R^2 0.433 0.459 0.53 0.574 0.401 0.433 0.518 0.565









2000 last obs. last obs. last obs. last obs.
Note: The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution. The regressors
are: IP= investor protection, IP_HIGH= IP*dummy for IP>median, SM=stock market
capitalization as ratio of credit to the private sector, School= share of people above 25 years
with completed secondary education, LRGDP(2)= log of real per capita GDP (squared), GOV=
government expenditure/GDP, TRADE= (import+export)/GDP. Estimation is performed with
OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 per
cent significance level.
Table 3. Financial Structure and Income Inequality (Gini) - Cross-section 1980-20001234 56789 1 0
SM 2.265** 7.743*** 7.164** 7.105** 6.975** 1.871* 6.262* 7.469* 7.663** 8.908**
[0.911] [2.708] [2.976] [3.081] [3.253] [1.007] [3.153] [3.735] [3.501] [3.630]
SM^2 -2.814** -2.649* -2.724** -2.591* -2.267 -2.756 -3.197* -4.038**
[1.293] [1.408] [1.373] [1.590] [1.594] [1.841] [1.658] [1.733]
SCHOOL -0.194*** -0.219*** -0.105* -0.111* -0.112* -0.171*** -0.195*** -0.179*** -0.237*** -0.249***
[0.045] [0.046] [0.057] [0.062] [0.062] [0.052] [0.050] [0.062] [0.070] [0.071]
LRGDP 31.565** 33.634** 29.789* -19.452 -18.08 -21.37
[15.675] [15.736] [15.690] [24.946] [26.898] [29.020]
LRGDP^2 -1.962** -2.095** -1.886** 1.033 0.902 1.06
[0.893] [0.901] [0.899] [1.458] [1.587] [1.709]
GOV -0.12 -0.102 -0.142* -0.129
[0.083] [0.081] [0.082] [0.083]
TRADE 0.009 0.012 0.051 0.075**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.031] [0.032]
R^2 within 0.118 0.157 0.122 0.13 0.143 0.118 0.157 0.175 0.221 0.251
R^2 between 0.168 0.204 0.367 0.377 0.374 0.166 0.2 0.159 0.133 0.118
Obs. 113 113 113 113 111 113 113 113 113 111
Countries 58 58 58 58 57 58 58 58 58 57
Country-FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: the dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income distribution. The regressors are: SM=stock market
capitalization as ratio of credit to the private sector, School= share of people above 25 years with completed
secondary education, LRGDP(2)= log of real per capita GDP (squared), GOV= government expenditure, TRADE=
(import+export)/GDP. Estimation is performed with Least Squares with random effects (columns 1-5) and country
fixed effects (columns 6-10). Columns 5 and 10 are estimated on the sample without Ghana. Robust standard errors
are clustered by country and reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level.
Table 4. Financial Structure and Income Inequality (Gini) - Panel 1976-20001234568 1 0
Top 1 to 10 
per cent
Top 1 to 10 
per cent
Top 1 to 10 
per cent
Top 1 to 10 
per cent
Top 1 to 10 
per cent
Top 1 to 10 
per cent
Top 0.1 to 
10 per cent
Top 0.1 to 
10 per cent
SM 1.760*** 1.667*** 0.626*** 1.139** 0.908 0.718* 5.918*** 11.256**
[0.402] [0.484] [0.238] [0.513] [0.534] [0.346] [2.100] [3.905]
SM^2 -0.932*** -0.967*** -0.318*** -0.686*** -0.665** -0.352** -2.266* -2.748***
[0.203] [0.256] [0.099] [0.220] [0.253] [0.130] [1.305] [0.896]
SCHOOL 0.009 0.005 -0.006* 0.028** 0.027* -0.01 -0.012 -0.167
[0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.013] [0.013] [0.008] [0.034] [0.102]
LRGDP -19.056*** -43.548*** -19.341** -39.615** -146.341* -155.049*
[6.698] [7.176] [7.434] [13.663] [74.978] [72.843]
LRGDP^2 0.981*** 2.214*** 0.996** 2.023** 7.643** 7.849**
[0.332] [0.358] [0.380] [0.686] [3.659] [3.444]
ENTRY 1.390*** 1.650*** 0.421 -0.088
[0.255] [0.392] [0.503] [0.357]
R^2 within 0.647 0.716 0.874 0.675 0.754 0.883 0.84 0.901
R^2 between 0.193 0.33 0.355 0.127 0.175 0.288 0.344 0.00358
Obs. 42 42 24 42 42 24 24 24
Countries 16 16 14 16 16 14 14 14
Country-FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Table 5. Financial Structure and Top Income Inequality - Panel 1976-2004
Note: the dependent variables are: average income of top 1 over top 10 percentile (columns 1-6) and of top 0.1 over
top 10 percentile (columns 7-10) of the income distribution. The regressors are: SM=stock market capitalization as
ratio of credit to the private sector, School= share of people above 25 years with completed secondary education,
LRGDP= log of real per capita GDP, ENTRY= percentage annual change in the number of establishments.
Estimation is performed with Least Squares with random effects (columns 1-3 and 7-8) and country fixed effects
(columns 4-6 and 9-10). Robust standard errors are clustered by country and reported in brackets. *, **, and ***
stand for 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level.123 4 5 6
IP 0.128 2.004** 0.255 1.922* 0.059*** 0.060***
[0.457] [0.959] [0.443] [0.984] [0.019] [0.020]
IP_HIGH -1.562** -1.419*
[0.724] [0.807]
SCHOOL -0.260*** -0.251*** -0.195** -0.207**
[0.076] [0.071] [0.091] [0.090]
LRGDP -0.05 -0.053
[0.058] [0.060]
EFF_JUD -0.852 -0.594 0.053* 0.055*
[0.777] [0.857] [0.028] [0.029]
CR -0.436 -0.316 -0.011
[1.197] [1.184] [0.040]
R^2 0.237 0.31 0.267 0.324 0.327 0.328
Countries 47 47 47 47 46 46
Dep. var. Gini Gini Gini Gini SM SM
Note: the dependent variables are the Gini coefficient of the income
distribution (columns 1-4) and SM= stock market capitalization as a ratio
of credit to the private sector (columns 5-6). The regressors are: IP=
investor protection, IP_HIGH= IP*dummy for IP>median, SCHOOL=
share of people above 25 years with completed secondary education,
LRGDP= log of real per capita GDP, EFF_JUD= index of efficiency of
the judiciary, CR= index of creditors' rights. Estimation is performed with
Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard errors are reported in
brackets. *, **, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level.
Table 6. Investor Protection and Income Inequality - Robustness - 
Cross-section 1980-2000123 45 6
SM_CAP 4.806*** 7.600* 3.736** 5.905
[1.342] [4.578] [1.639] [5.728]
SM_CAP^2 -1.392 -1.149
[1.816] [2.082]
PRIVO -5.330*** -8.435* -1.491 0.717
[1.799] [5.148] [2.045] [6.698]
PRIVO^2 1.742 -1.585
[3.073] [3.322]
SCHOOL -0.163*** -0.170*** -0.171** -0.188*** -0.222*** -0.189***









R^2 within 0.106 0.104 0.121 0.129 0.184 0.198
R^2 between 0.245 0.25 0.171 0.153 0.331 0.256
Obs. 111 111 111 111 108 108
Countries 57 57 57 57 54 54
Country-FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Table 7. Financial Structure vs Financial Development and Income 
Inequality (Gini) - Panel 1976-2000
Note: the dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the income
distribution. The regressors are: SM_CAP= stock market capitalization as
ratio of GDP, PRIVO= credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP,
SM=stock market capitalization as ratio of credit to the private sector,
School= share of people above 25 years with completed secondary
education, CR= index of creditors' rights. Estimation is performed with Least
Squares with random effects and country fixed effects. Robust standard
errors are clustered by country and reported in brackets. *, **, and *** stand
for 10, 5, and 1 per cent significance level.